

CHAPTER 9

DOWNSIZING AND SHIFTING OPERATIONAL EMPHASIS FOR THE US AIR FORCE: THE BUSH AND CLINTON YEARS, 1989-2000

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If the period from 1989-2000 began when the Cold War was still “hot,” it also encompassed the end of the Cold War and began what is still referred to as the Post-Cold War period. It marks a time when the US began the transition from a well-defined and fairly constant security landscape of impressive duration. Where the transition is to remain the subject of continuing debate and speculation. It has however, transformed the arms control community. While the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact are not solely responsible for the transformation, it was the seminal event and provides the context in which to reflect upon the arms control trends of this period.

An examination of this period is, at best, a work-in-progress as the lens of time has not yet moved far enough from the events to permit a clear picture of the importance and interplay of the various forces at work. Indeed, within the Washington arms control community, sides are still being taken over the questions of what happened, why, and with what result. This condition is exacerbated by the fact that much of the detailed arms control documentation of this period remains classified, thus forcing undue reliance on individual remembrances of events that grow less clear with the passage of time. Events of the period are thus more susceptible to the innocent and unavoidable memory lapses of individuals concerning what negotiating positions were taken, and why, because they can no longer separate those memories from later events. The current agendas of involved organizations may also affect the way significant events of the last decade are now described. The classified nature of the documentation thus limits the examination of specific treaty issues of interest to the Air Force to a more general treatment than would be preferred.

IN THE BEGINNING

Sometime between 1989 and 1992, the US arms control infrastructure reached its high-water mark. Leadership was experienced; organizations were clearly defined, staffed with talented personnel, and well funded. This was certainly true within the US Air Force. On the Air Staff, the responsibility for all facets of arms control—from negotiation support to treaty implementation and compliance activities—was centralized in the International Negotiations Division (AF/XOXI) [today the National Security Policy Division, AF/XONP]. This was perhaps the only Air Staff organization that defined Air Force policy, made plans, determined and budgeted for the resources necessary, and directed Air Force-wide execution of those plans. At its peak, over two-dozen officers were assigned to AF/XOXI.

Due to the direct impact of nuclear arms control efforts on its warfighting capabilities, an arms control, or more properly, a treaties division, existed in the Plans and Policy directorate of the Strategic Air Command (SAC/XPXT). This division directed the execution of Air Force treaty implementation and compliance activities at SAC bases. It also functioned as SAC's conduit into both the Air and Joint Staffs. That SAC had a direct relationship with both organizations resulted from its dual status as both the only remaining Specified Command, with a Commander in Chief (CINC) and his attendant combatant command responsibilities, and as an Air Force Major Command with its Service responsibilities to train, organize, and equip combat forces for employment. In this regard, SAC was unique in the Department of Defense. It had the responsibility to acquire and train, in peacetime, the force it would employ in war. A Specified Command is comprised of only a single Service, in this case the Air Force, and as such, the Air Staff clearly had a special relationship with the predominate nuclear warfighter of the day. This relationship extended to their respective arms control organizations.

SAC not only heavily influenced Air Force positions on arms control issues; it was the source of many experienced arms control staff officers later assigned to XOXI. An excellent example of this, and of the experienced leadership enjoyed by the Air Force arms control community early in this period, was Richard B. Wallace. Wallace, a B-52 radar navigator, was assigned as a major to SAC/XPXT before being transferred to AF/XOXI. After his first tour in XOXI, he served in a variety of arms control positions, including Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Bringing with him a wealth of knowledge on the treaties and related issues,

experience with the negotiating process, and close personal contacts with many in the arms control community, Colonel Wallace returned to XOXI early in this period to lead the division.

The US internal negotiation support process was well structured and understood by those government agencies involved, as were the various perspectives and equities of the participants. The history of Cold War arms control, at that time, was one of extended bilateral negotiations. These negotiations were focused on nuclear force structure and supported by extremely detailed analyses of the relative costs and benefits accrued to each side in each possible interpretation of each element of every proposal. The perspective of the Air Force was that arms control was the use of diplomacy and international law to increase national security and promote international stability. This included actions which:

- Decreased the danger of military and technical surprise;
- Improved military transparency and built confidence;
- Controlled the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other sophisticated weapon technology; and,
- Reduced the risk to defensive forces and noncombatants from hostile acts.

Clearly, from a military perspective, the value of an arms control proposal was determined by its effect on national security. At that time, the Soviet Union presented a clear and present danger to national survival. National security was the over-riding concern and was the responsibility of the Chiefs of the four military Services. Given the influence of the Service Chiefs at the start of this period, there was little chance that any arms control proposal which placed limitations on the development, fielding, or use of military equipment, or forces, yet offered no reasonable expectation of increased national security, would be accepted. Treaty progress often appeared glacial, but there was an underlying confidence that the agreements were being well-defined, the security ramifications and force structure implications were well understood, and talking with the Russians was better than fighting with them. There was also a sense that arms control was on the verge of major breakthroughs.

The potential for breakthroughs had two major elements. First, it became apparent that exciting possibilities existed for further deep bilateral reductions in nuclear forces. As the scope of the economic collapse of the


Soviet Union became evident, this sense of an upcoming breakthrough found focus as a desire to codify the US Cold-War victory. This could be accomplished by capturing, in legally binding documents, the force structure reductions that would be forced, at least in the near term, on the Soviet Union, and later Russia, by economic limitations. The other potential breakthrough was based upon a growing awareness that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and technology (outside the context of East-West competition) was a serious problem that would likely become worse as the Soviet Union's economic and political decline accelerated. There was widespread interest in the utility of arms control vehicles to effectively address these broad new challenges.

As shown in Figure 2, the sense that there were new and exciting possibilities for arms control proved to be accurate. When the US Air Force came into existence, there was one agreement for the Air Force to comply with—the Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and biological weapons. Even when the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed in 1972, there were few agreements, and fewer still relevant to the Air Force. Starting in the 1987 time frame, however, the number of arms control agreements increased rapidly, and by the end of 2000, the US had signed over 40 arms control treaties and agreements with implications for the Air Force. This rapid expansion was only an indicator of more fundamental changes.

WHAT CHANGED

An essentially bipolar world emerged shortly after the end of World War II (WWII) and provided a useful military, political and economic construct for over four decades. The breakup of the bi-polar structure, marked by the fall of the Soviet Union, transfigured much of the world and fostered a significant increase in the number of actors and regional conflicts. These “new” actors and conflicts, which appeared to fuel the proliferation fire, were often viewed by the US as new and different because they took place outside the familiar context of US—USSR competition. Many, however, were actors and conflicts that had lain more or less dormant for years due to the overriding influence of the superpower conflict and the tight control exercised by the Soviet Union within its post-WWII sphere of influence.

Figure 2: Treaties and Agreements Growth



If arms control were to address these broad new challenges and objectives, new arms control tools would clearly be required. Obviously, bi-lateral treaties between the US and Soviet Union, or later Russia, would not be effective. New multi-lateral agreements were required and a variety of new confidence and security building measures, such as observations and force structure data reporting requirements, were also introduced. The movement from bi-lateral treaties to multi-lateral treaties included the ABM Treaty between the US and the Soviet Union, which was formally “multi-lateralized” by determining the Soviet Union successor states. With the end of the Cold War, the trend of US involvement in arms control was a gradual and informal movement from a clear emphasis on improving security to the more nebulous objectives of fostering global norms of behavior and supporting broad US political and economic agendas. This is to say, some reduction in US combat capability became acceptable even if the US gained no additional security. This change in direction produced arms control efforts increasingly disconnected from the national security strategy. The results of the US arms control process also became less predictable as the center of influence shifted away from the Services.

Service positions were no longer decisive on arms control issues due to a combination of factors. First, the fall of the Soviet Union removed the clear and present danger, the accepted metric, against which the effects on national security of any arms control proposal could be assessed. This proved to be a serious deficiency when the broadened objectives of arms control led naturally to the increased involvement of non-governmental organizations with humanitarian and abolitionist, rather than national security, interests. This eventually led to proposals to ban or greatly restrict the use of so-called blinding lasers (which could have eliminated most US laser range finders), the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Land Mines, and most recently, small arms controls. Political and economic concerns began to dominate what had been political-military discussions.

Instead of meaningful participation in the process of formulating the US position from the onset, the Services were increasingly brought into the discussion late in the internal US debate, and in essence asked, “Is there any reason the US cannot . . . ?” There was less interest in the effect on national security of a particular agreement because “as the last remaining super power, we can afford to give up our. . . .” What concern there was focused more on whether US compliance with a proposal was physically possible and, on occasion, the cost of compliance. Arms control became well and truly disconnected from national security strategy to the extent that the Air

Staff developed a briefing, shared with the other Services and Joint Staff at the three-star level, illustrating that national security was facing a “death by a thousand cuts” from the accumulated effects of numerous arms control concessions. Even in nuclear reductions, the question of “how low can you go” seemed driven by economics and ideology, not security concerns. By historical standards, major arms control negotiations were completed unbelievably rapidly, and without the benefit of analysis concerning the national security implications.

Under the Clinton Administration, the Air Force perspective on arms control outlined earlier was increasingly out of step. From a Service perspective, it appeared arms control had been transformed from a sometimes-painful tool useful in increasing national security to an end unto itself. At the same time, the reduced force structure and less stable, more unpredictable world increased the desire of the Air Force to maintain current operational flexibility and keep future options open. This flexibility was viewed as essential in an era when it was seemingly impossible to predict where US troops would next be deployed, and why, or what new defense challenges the US would turn to advanced technology to address. Accordingly, during this period, Air Force arms control priorities shifted from protecting force structure to avoiding operational constraints and opposing proposals that would clearly limit or prohibit the military uses of future technology. It became increasingly difficult for the Air Staff to support arms control initiatives of the Clinton Administration that seemed to further what the Air Staff was trying to avoid.

The military was not unique. Congress was openly antagonistic and as a result, congressional consultations were avoided, and treaties were signed by the President that had virtually no chance of ratification. The START II Modification and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Adaptation are good examples. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was ratified by the US (barely), largely to ensure a US role in the governing body, but was widely viewed as being unverifiable and unenforceable, yet permitting the most intrusive inspections to date. The Biological Weapons Convention showed all indications of being worse yet—more intrusive than the CWC, yet even less verifiable. Further, the US rejected the inspection protocol, largely due not to security concerns of the military, but rather the intense lobbying of the pharmaceutical industry whose industrial secrets were potentially at risk. During this period of decreasing military influence in the arms control process, the Air Force was also simultaneously coming to grips with the effects of two other factors: the gradually increasing responsibility

and authority of the Joint Staff and CINCs due to the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the disestablishment of SAC in 1992.

Authority and responsibility in the military is seen as a “zero sum” equation. If one organization is assigned more, another has less. The increased authority and responsibility of the Joint Staff and CINCs mandated by Goldwater-Nichols came at the expense of the military Services. The shift did not occur at once, certainly not in the arms control arena. It took place gradually as the CINCs and Joint Staff came to understand the expanded limits of their new authority and the Services gave ground grudgingly. Bureaucratic momentum is slow to change, but over time the ascendancy of the CINCs took place. This did not, however, leave the Services without authority in arms control. Treaty implementation and compliance remained largely a Service responsibility, but establishing war fighting requirements, and thus the assessment of an arms control proposal’s effect on national security, became predominantly the role of the CINCs. The other contributing factor the Air Force was coming to grips with involved SAC.

The transmutation of the Specified Command, SAC, into a Unified Command, US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) caused a fundamental transformation of the Air Force. In this case, some effects were felt almost immediately, but here also, others were recognized more slowly. The immediate effects involved the transfer of the Service responsibilities of an Air Force Major Command to train, organize, and equip forces. The retirement of the SAC shield made possible a large reorganization of the Air Force. As SAC stood down, so did the Tactical Air Command and the Military Airlift Command. Replacing these three commands were two: Air Combat Command (ACC) and Air Mobility Command (AMC). The responsibility to plan, program for, and train SAC’s tanker aircraft went to AMC. Initially, the bomber and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) responsibilities both went to ACC; however, after about a year, the ICBMs moved to Air Force Space Command.

USSTRATCOM, ACC, and AMC all established provisional headquarters elements before the actual stand-up date to smooth the transition to the new command structure. Regardless, it was still a traumatic event, particularly at ACC and AMC where the transfer of responsibilities was significant and occurred, in a very real sense, overnight. The change was also felt at the Air Staff, albeit more gradually. The change was more gradual for two reasons. First, no SAC responsibilities were formally

transferred to the Air Staff and secondly, the circumstances and personnel surrounding the stand-up of USSTRATCOM provided a certain amount of continuity.

Almost two-thirds of the personnel billets in USSTRATCOM were planned to be Air Force, with one-third being Navy with a smattering of Army and Marine Corps billets. At the time USSTRATCOM stood-up, however, well over three-fourths of the staff was comprised of Air Force personnel as former SAC personnel were retained in the new Command for varying periods of time. This was done to either spread out arrival dates of new personnel in an effort to avoid the turbulence which would occur three years later if the majority of the staff completed its joint tour and transferred at the same time, or to allow SAC personnel, who chose not to accept another assignment, the opportunity to complete their careers and retire. Additionally, some billets were identified as critical to the USSTRATCOM transition and the SAC incumbent was retained to provide continuity. This initial imbalance was acceptable to the US Navy as it provided time for their personnel system to “grow” into satisfying the new USSTRATCOM staff requirement for over 200 Navy personnel.

In the nuclear arms control arena, the continuity provided by three Air Force officers slowed the inevitable growing apart of the Air Staff and USSTRATCOM for several years. The last CINCSAC, General “Lee” Butler, became the first CINCSTRAT; the last SAC/XP, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Resources, Major General Robert Linhard, became the first USSTRATCOM J-5, Director of Plans and Policy; and Colonel Robert “Dusty” Rhoades, the last SAC/XPX, Director of Force Plans and Policy, became the first USSTRATCOM J-51, Chief of the Strategy and Policy Division. All were experienced “arms controllers,” and were very familiar with the current nuclear arms control issues from Air Force and SAC perspectives. Colonel Rhoades had led SAC/XPXT earlier in his career and, as a colonel; General Linhard had served in the National Security Council during the Reagan Administration when the groundwork for the treaty successes of the Bush Administration was put into place. General Butler had supported the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks while assigned to the Air Staff in 1974 and had served as the Joint Staff J-5 prior to assuming command of SAC in 1991. In effect, a talented and experienced SAC arms control “chain of command” transitioned unbroken to USSTRATCOM. As a result, although common interests facilitated a more robust relationship with the Navy, the close relationship between SAC and the Air Staff was retained for their tenure. Naval officers would later move into all three of these positions

on at least a rotational basis, and this encouraged the natural development also of a stronger relationship with the Navy. However, USSTRATCOM appropriately developed its closest relationship with the Joint Staff.

As time passed, another effect of SAC's demise was recognized. The Air Force had lost its organizational focal point for nuclear matters. On the Air Staff, the historical dependency on SAC for nuclear expertise gradually became apparent as the interests and agendas of the Air Staff and USSTRATCOM diverged over time. It also became apparent that, in this regard, neither ACC nor Air Force Space Command had filled the void left by SAC. In response, and as part of a larger reorganization of the Air Staff in 1996, General Ronald Fogelman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, directed the creation of AF/XON, the Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate. As part of this reorganization, XOXI formally assumed additional responsibilities involving counterproliferation and became XONP, the National Security Policy Division. Despite the additional responsibilities, however, the division's manpower was being steadily reduced as a result of a series of large, Congressionally mandated, Service headquarters staff reductions. Although it had greater responsibilities, XONP manning had been reduced over 60 percent and, by the end of 1999, less than ten officers were assigned.

WHAT WORKED

The central Air Force arms control organization, XOXI, entered this period with experienced leadership, an office well manned with experienced people, and great institutional power in the arms control process. By the end of the period, XONP had none of these things, yet had undeniably remained remarkably effective in influencing events throughout the period. This happened for a variety of reasons, among them the personal contributions of Major General Linhard.

After completing his tour as the USSTRATCOM J-5 in 1994, General Linhard was assigned to the Air Staff as the Director of Plans, AF/XOX where, as part of a broad and diverse set of responsibilities, he supervised and directed the activities of XOXI. Exceptionally well respected in the US arms control community, he had remained current in nuclear arms control matters as the J-5. He brought to the Air Staff a belief that good ideas combined with a thorough understanding of the issues and process could be decisive. Accordingly, he emphasized thoroughly understanding the staff processes involved in an issue, the key actors and their equities, and seeking

to strategically affect results through intellectual excellence. This philosophy required the Air Force to be proactive in the arms control process. As the Air Force's institutional power had been greatly reduced, the Air Force now had to demonstrate it offered great value to the process. Key to the strategy was compensating for the continuity and source of experienced arms control officers that disappeared with SAC and the reduction in Service headquarters staff personnel. Air Staff efforts to address this shortfall focused on hiring highly qualified contractor personnel to augment the Air Staff arms control office. Examples include Commander Kenneth J. Chapman, USN Retired, who was the acknowledged Joint Staff and DOD expert on the CFE Treaty when he retired and Dr. Mitch Nikolich, whose academic background and involvement in missile defense programs during the Reagan years enabled the Air Force to achieve a strong technical understanding of futuristic missile defense and the associated treaty implications and issues. It would be difficult to overestimate the impact of these talented individuals, others like them, in advancing Air Force positions in the arms control arena through the years that followed.

Another way that XOXI, and later XONP, added value to the arms control community on a routine basis was by identifying emerging arms control issues, thoughtfully constructing a framework which identified the implications, pros and cons, and then vetted the work with the broader arms control community—in effect helping the community determine how to think about an idea conceptually before it became an issue. Key factors in the success of this approach were the collegial manner in which the vetting was accomplished, the senior level of the personnel, the personal nature of the relationships involved, and the trust this approach fostered.

Many of the major XOXI/XONP efforts were vetted as part of a conference series held at Airlie House, a conference center in Warrenton, Virginia. These conferences were typically 1½-2 days in length. While the format of the programs varied slightly, it generally involved a half day of the Air Force presenting a body of work it had finished, usually a framework which organized the important factors and implications of a given issue or question. This was followed by a half-day or more of small group activities designed to validate the work by using it, often building upon it in some way to become familiar with the rationale supporting the construct or explore the implications of different US courses of action. During the last half day, the small groups briefed their activities to the entire conference and the results were discussed.

A series of ten Airlie House conferences were held between 1995 and

2000:

- Airlie I (Arms Control Political—Military Game); the international political ramifications of early implementation of START II;
- Airlie II (Alternative Futures for Strategic Arms Control); three START II implementation scenarios—accelerated, on-time, and delayed;
- Airlie III (Strategic Offense/Defense Issues); strategic offense/defense issues in the current security environment;
- Airlie IV (Asian Regional Security Issues); understanding arms control and proliferation issues in Asia;
- Airlie V (The Future of US Nuclear Strategy); factors affecting U.S. nuclear strategy and implications for the Air Force;
- Airlie VI (US Nuclear Strategy—Back to the Future); role of nuclear weapons in national security and potential objectives of arms control;
- Airlie VII (Counterproliferation); linkage between policy objectives and operational capabilities shaping efforts to organize, train, and equip forces.
- Airlie VIII (Implementing Counterproliferation); inform senior officials on DOD and Air Force counterproliferation initiatives and built consensus;
- Airlie IX (The Future of Air Force Nuclear Strategy); the future nuclear force structure requirements, issues, and challenges facing the Air Force;
- Airlie X (The Air Force Agenda for Arms Control); the extent current and future treaties could restrict technologies and ways to resolve restrictions.

Clearly the quality of the Air Force work was important to the success of these conferences, but no less important were the participants. Largely due to General Linhard's efforts, the list of conferees was literally a "Who's

Who” of the DOD arms control world. Mr. Bob Bell, from the National Security Council, was a frequent attendee, as were Ambassadors Linton Brooks, Henry Cooper, Reed Hamner, Bob Joseph, and Ron Lehman. At least one general officer and often several always represented the Air Force. On occasion, either the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force or the Air Force Director of Air and Space Operations were present. Depending on the subject being addressed, conferees also represented the Joint Staff, other Services, CINCs, SHAPE, NATO, several offices in OSD, the Department of Energy, and the Defense Nuclear Agency, later, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and most recently, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Also included were the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Laboratories, national intelligence organizations, and senior policy analysts and futurists.

The effects of the Airlie House series were three-fold. First, the series established Air Force credibility and involvement on a subject. Second, it provided a forum for the Air Force to informally and subtly register its position, or at least the intellectual underpinnings of a future position, on an issue, determine the leanings and rationale of other agencies likely to be involved, and hopefully sway a few towards the Air Force line of reasoning. Last, it provided an opportunity for the Air Staff to develop the personal relationships that enabled the sharing of sensitive information.

This same philosophy extended to implementation and compliance activities. During this period, the Air Force routinely supported the Joint Staff as part of the US delegation during negotiating sessions in Geneva that could last six weeks. Given the manpower cuts, this became increasingly burdensome for the Air Staff, but in truth, due to their own manpower reductions, the Joint Staff nuclear arms control organization required support from the Air Force to be completely effective, particularly as the objectives of the military and Clinton Administration diverged. In this environment, it was advantageous for the Air Staff to be inside the US delegation where it could immediately inform and influence the US position when the Russians raised an issue. These lengthy sessions in Geneva also provided another opportunity to establish a close working relationship with key actors in the US arms control community that would keep the Air Staff informed as events unfolded even after returning to Washington, DC.

Other initiatives of XONP demonstrating the proactive mind-set of the time included the development of a treaty “Compliance Gameplan” for the Airborne Laser (ABL) and working treaty compliance issues within the US government. The ABL Gameplan was designed to ensure the Air Force did

not inadvertently violate a treaty during the ABL's development phase or take an action, such as testing the ABL against an ICBM, which would cause it to be defined as a strategic ballistic missile defense system, and thus prohibited by the ABM Treaty. The second part of this effort involved introducing information on new weapons systems to the U.S. Compliance Review Group (CRG), the DOD forum with the responsibility to formally determine, for the US government, treaty compliance when it even appears there may be an issue. Being proactive in providing information to the CRG well before a specific compliance issue arose paid huge dividends for the Air Force both in preventing an issue from being raised due to a simple misunderstanding concerning the operation or capabilities of a weapons system, and in successfully defending the Air Staff position if a compliance issue was raised.

Sharing information to educate others involved in the broader arms control process regarding Air Force weapons systems and procedures also proved valuable. For instance, in the interest in improving warhead monitoring, the US was contemplating a proposal that would open nuclear Weapon Storage Areas (WSAs) for inspection. This would permit the nuclear weapons, in their sealed containers, to be viewed and counted. The Air Force strongly opposed this and arranged a tour of base-level WSAs for involved members of the Joint Staff and OSD. It was quickly established that the specific proposal was unworkable. Similarly, the Air Force also provided a forum for the larger arms control community to explore more complex issues and create a common understanding of the intricacies of implementation. This established the Air Force's credibility and provided it the opportunity to highlight important Air Force operational issues and influence the US position. It also served, in the same manner as Airlie House conferences and JCIC sessions, to build the common frame of reference and relationships that would ensure the Air Force was considered a valuable participant in any discussion of the issue. For example, the CWC inspection protocols included provision for a "Challenge Inspection." If directed at the US this would initiate the most intrusive arms control-driven inspection a US facility had ever experienced. In an effort to foster an understanding of the operational, security, and policy issues and potential pitfalls of such an inspection, the Air Force hosted a series of "mock challenge inspections" at active US air bases both in the CONUS and abroad. There was broad inter-agency participation in these week-long, high-fidelity exercises designed to test various US procedures and policies prior to treaty entry into force. As a result of this initiative, many US procedures were revised and policies

modified as a better understanding of the demands of such an inspection and the military equities at risk was achieved.

WHEN IT WAS OVER

By the end of the Clinton terms, the way the world thought about arms control had changed. The concepts of equality, verifiability, and deep cuts that were the heritage of the Reagan years were no longer the cornerstones of negotiations. Nuclear negotiations were at a full stop; it appeared the Russians were neither really interested in additional cuts nor particularly influenced by the size of the US force. The number of arms control agreements had slowed appreciably: 26 agreements concluded between 1987 and 1995, compared to only four between 1996 and 2001. Perhaps more troubling from a US perspective is that historic US allies in Europe seemed interested in arms control efforts that would limit US unilateral capabilities or constrain US technology advances in areas such as space and information operations. In some US circles, there was now growing dissatisfaction with the old bilateral treaties and recognition that they not only failed to address the new security concerns, they could also be counterproductive. The old tools, force reduction and inspection, were still in place, but Russian compliance was increasingly not enforced for economic or political reasons. As a result, the utility of these agreements was increasingly called into question. Due to the rapid completion of several major treaties early in the period (INF, START I, CFE) with several others in work (CWC, START II, Open Skies), emphasis in the Air Force had shifted from treaty negotiation support to implementation and compliance issues. New compliance concerns were being raised involving treaties of indefinite duration as the discontinuities between the current security environment and those at the time of treaty signature became increasingly apparent. For example, the CFE Treaty did not envision the circumstances surrounding US involvement in Bosnia, but did complicate the logistics problem of US force deployment. Likewise, the Vienna Document did not envision a situation which would permit the Russians to conduct ten inspections of NATO staging bases and provide information on force composition and location to a third party actively engaged in a conflict with NATO. Yet, that is what happened. Finally, from a US perspective, the ABM Treaty was never intended to restrict theater missile defense or leave the US homeland vulnerable to rogue threats, yet arguably, it was doing both.

The new multilateral treaties were often not considered a success either.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was one example. Although generally regarded in military circles as useful, the pressure by “Non-Nuclear Weapons States” on the “Nuclear Weapons States” for a specific commitment on nuclear disarmament left many in the US wondering if the cost of the treaty might exceed its usefulness in the near future. More importantly, there was a sense that with the end of the Cold War, and its underlying economic and political competition, old bilateral treaties, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and the ABM Treaty, were out of place. Military treaties seldom exist between friendly nations, and, rather than being viewed as the foundation of the US strategic relationship with the Russians, there was a growing suspicion these bilateral treaties might only be preserving an adversarial relationship and inhibiting the evolution of a warmer one. As the period ended, there was in the arms control community a sense that the US was again on the verge of major change, but great uncertainty as to what the direction would be.

TREATY ISSUE ADDENDUM

The **Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)** which entered into force in 1994 is a good example of a treaty that was largely negotiated in one reality (Cold War), but entered into force in another (Post-Cold War). Generally accepted as a landmark treaty, there continued to be implementation and compliance issues discussed at the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC). Examples include use of ICBM parts for space activities, B-1B cruise missile hard point covers, and Peacekeeper elimination procedures. These issues resulted from individual interpretations of treaty text and, in some cases, conflicting treaty provisions. For the Air Force, these were largely resource issues. The Air Force was unwilling to spend additional, and in its view unnecessary, money to satisfy Russian concerns involving issues not believed to be important to the Russians. Rather, they were believed to be issues of “convenience” used to keep the other treaty partner on the defensive. As such, even if resolved, another issue would quickly be found. These issues were not resolved.

The **Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II)** was ratified and represented the US attempt to codify the Russian economic disadvantage. In several areas, it clearly favored the US and was substantially modified by the Russian Duma before ratification. The modified treaty has not been resubmitted to the US Senate as of this writing. For the Air Force, the significant issue was that the retention of the bomber conventional capability

the US was finding increasingly important and was apparently not taken into account when negotiating the treaty. That the treaty states bombers would count against nuclear warhead limits “as equipped” without defining the term or stating any requirement to modify the aircraft all but guarantees compliance issues with the Russians if the treaty is ratified by the US.

A Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty III (START III) was first envisioned as a rapid follow-on to START II, and it was presented by the Clinton Administration as a way to re-energize the nuclear reduction process. The concept was to resolve the START II impasse by getting past the START II equity issues through a substantial reduction in the numbers of deployed nuclear weapons permitted by START II. This effort died when it became apparent the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not support START III without a START II entry into force pre-requisite. Without START II as a known departure point, the Chiefs found it impossible to define the issues, goals, and security objectives for START III or assess the impact on US national security. START III standing alone was too unfocused and unbounded for the Chiefs to support given their distrust of a US negotiating process that no longer recognized that no agreement might be better than a bad agreement.

The **Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty** (ABM Treaty) raised serious issues associated with Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and, later, with national missile defense. Although a treaty vehicle already existed to resolve the issues, in 1993 Congress required a treaty compliance review of three specific TMD programs, including the Army’s Theater Air Defense (THAD) program. Both the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the US Army conducted reviews. It was eventually concluded that THAD could likely violate the ABM Treaty. This was a serious issue because if THAD had a compliance problem, there were probably many to follow as improved technology increased capability. Given the US experience with theater ballistic missiles during Desert Storm, there was a need to negotiate room for TMD in the ABM Treaty. Within the US government this evolved into an internal debate concerning broad versus narrow interpretations of the treaty. The Air Force views on many issues were not adopted, and it was soundly defeated on the issue of space-based interceptors, despite the strong intervention of USSPACECOM. However, the Air Staff was successful in arguing that many issues, such as the role of space sensors, definition and use of “other physical principles,” and the ABL were simply too complex to address with the Russians at this time. Although signed in 1997, the agreement on demarcation has not been ratified. The great irony is that in successfully driving such a hard line for a narrow interpretation of the treaty,

the Clinton Administration may have inadvertently sown the seeds of the treaty's demise at the hands of the succeeding Bush Administration. Time will tell. The other interesting note is that the US resolved all three of the specific program issues, which ignited the original debate, internally before the foreign negotiations were completed.

The **Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces** (INF), responsible for the removal of an entire class of nuclear weapons, provided an example of unintended consequences resulting from treaties of indefinite duration. Were Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) airplanes or cruise missiles? The Air Force position was they were airplanes; however, the Treaty language provided no specific definition other than range parameters, which were in fact, descriptive of the UCAVs capabilities. This was a newly recognized shortcoming of the treaty because the technology enabling development of the UCAVs did not exist when the treaty was drafted. It was an important issue to the Air Force because if considered cruise missiles, the INF Treaty prohibited UCAVs. This was an internal US issue; however, it was not decided that UCAVs were aircraft until 2001.

The **Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe** (CFE) entered into force in 1992; however, it was formally revised/adapted in 1999 to address Russian exemptions from the agreements and the new European realities, which included the former Warsaw Pact nations of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining NATO. The Air Force unsuccessfully opposed a US proposal to include long-range transport aircraft as treaty limited equipment, but the Russians declined to accept the proposal. The Air Force, with the support of USEUCOM, was successful in defeating US efforts to include fighter aircraft and attack helicopters in territorial ceilings. The Air Force argued that their inclusion would create a reporting requirement nightmare with no practical impact given the speed of the aircraft, and the CINC shared Air Staff concerns regarding loss of operational flexibility. Despite a four-year delay and relaxed requirements, the Russians are still not treaty compliant and the agreement has not been presented to the US Senate for ratification.

Open Skies was once the air observation portion of the CFE Treaty, but developed a life of its own. Given other intelligence resources available and Open Skies censor restrictions, Open Skies offers little intelligence value to the US. The most heated Air Staff issues involved resources. The Air Staff successfully defeated a proposal that would have forced it to buy new aircraft by arguing that the existing capability was sufficient to meet joint trial flight requirements and sufficient time existed to increase capability prior to treaty

entry into force, if needed. There has been some effort by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to establish direct operational control over the US Open Skies aircraft, but this was also defeated. Open Skies has yet to enter into force, but this may happen before the end of 2001.

The **Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Land Mines** (APL) raised issues of primary interest to the US Army. The Air Force supported the Army position opposing the US signing the agreement because the loss of area denial munitions would create an increased demand for direct air support from the Air Force. It was also evident that a number of countries that had signed the treaty were violating it with impunity. Obviously, it offered no increased US security and the US did not become a party to the treaty. The Clinton Administration did however establish a goal of signing the treaty by 2006 if alternatives to APL become available.

